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Abstract 
 
Estimates of Britain’s Comprehensive Wealth are reported for the period 1760-2000. They 
include measures of produced, natural and human capital, and illustrate the changing 
composition of Britain’s assets over this time period. We show how Genuine Savings, GS (a 
year-on-year measure of the change in total capital and a claimed indicator of sustainable 
development) has evolved over time. Changes in total wealth are compared to alternative, 
investment-based measures of GS, including variants augmented with the value of 
exogenous technology. Additionally, the possible effects of population change on wealth, 
and the implications of including CO2 emissions in natural capital are considered.  
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1.Introduction. 
How to define and measure sustainable development are questions which have interested 
economists for over three decades. Sustainable development of an economy has been 
defined by per capita utility not declining over time, or by an economy’s total stock of 
capital being maintained in value terms (Neumayer, 2010). The economy’s total capital 
stock comprises the sum of produced, natural, human and social capital stocks (World Bank, 
2006; Hanley, Shogren and White, 2006). Arrow et al (2012) relate sustainability to 
comprehensive wealth, which they argue depends on the value of “…the entire range of 
capital assets to which people have access…reproducible capital goods (roads, buildings), 
human capital, natural capital, population, public knowledge and institutions”. Within 
natural capital, one can identify non-renewable resources such as oil and coal reserves, but 
also the asset value of ecosystems which depend in turn on the flow of ecosystem services 
over time (Barbier, 2011). Arrow et al (2012) also treat time itself as a capital asset, 
representing exogenous shifts in an economy’s production possibilities. Sustainability is then 
measured by and depends on how society manages its comprehensive wealth: increases in 
comprehensive wealth translate into increases in inter-generational well-being. 
Here we show how British comprehensive wealth (total capital) and its constituents have 
changed over the period 1760-2000, a period which spans an industrial revolution during 
which significant changes occurred in the structure of the economy, its technology, its 
population and their standards of living. Examining changes in different components of the 
aggregate capital stock (human, produced, and natural) is of interest since economic 
development can be seen as a process whereby a country re-arranges and augments its 
capital stock, perhaps running down an initial stock of natural capital, and accumulating 
stocks of human and produced capital. We go on to calculate year-on-year changes in total 
wealth (a measure known as genuine savings, or comprehensive investment), highlighting 
the puzzles that emerge from the alternative measures. 
In the weak sustainability model (Neumayer, 2010), a sufficient degree of substitutability is 
assumed between the different elements of a nation’s total capital or comprehensive 
wealth so that no particular constraint needs to be placed on the time path of any particular 
element of the overall capital stock. This assumption has proved controversial, particularly 
the implication that natural capital can be run down without limit, so long as “enough” of 
the rents from natural capital extraction are re-invested in other forms of capital, when 
valued at correct shadow prices – the Hartwick Rule (Hartwick, 1977; d’Autume and 
Schubert, 2008). Given the assumption of weak sustainability, a macro level test of 
sustainable development is then to examine whether, year-on-year, an economy’s overall 
capital stock is falling, rising, or remaining constant. Beginning with Pearce and Atkinson 
(1993), the genuine savings2 emerged as a measure of changes in this overall capital stock 
(Hamilton and Clemens, 1999, Pezzey, 2004). Genuine savings (GS) sums the value of year-
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on-year changes in each individual element of the capital stock of a country, valuing these 
changes using shadow prices which reflect the marginal contribution of each stock to 
welfare, defined as the present value of aggregated utility over time. Changes in the stock of 
certain pollutants (such as CO2) are sometimes added to the index (for example in the World 
Bank estimates), valued using their marginal damage costs. Changes in human capital can be 
approximated using expenditures on education, or a measure based on discounted lifetime 
earnings by skill level (Arrow et al, 2012; Le et al, 2006; Escosura and Roses, 2010). The 
effects of technological change, resource price appreciation (capital gains/losses) and 
population change can also be incorporated into the GS indicator (Pezzey et al, 2006).  
The intuition of Pearce and Atkinson (1993) was that countries with positive levels of GS 
would satisfy a requirement of weak sustainability, since by implication their aggregate 
capital stocks would not be declining in value. In contrast, countries with negative GS values 
would be experiencing un-sustainable development. Whilst the theoretical underpinnings of 
GS are well-established (if much debated), empirical tests of the extent to which a positive 
GS in a particular year is a good indicator of improving (or at least of non-declining) well-
being over time remain very limited (Ferreira, Hamilton and Vincent, 2008). Greasley et al 
(2013) use the data reported in the present paper to test the relationship over the period 
1760-2000 between British GS and future well-being, and find that higher values for GS are 
associated with the present value of changes in future consumption and real wages up to 
100 years ahead.  
In the following Section 2 we outline how each component of comprehensive wealth or 
total capital which we were able to consider is calculated for Britain3. Section 3 reports 
alternative, investment-based, estimates of GS and section 4 explores some puzzles in 
wealth accounting and in measuring changes in comprehensive wealth. Section 5 explains 
how carbon dioxide emissions could be included in these calculations, whilst Section 6 
shows how population growth might dilute comprehensive wealth. Finally, section 7 
contains a concluding discussion. 
 
2.  Calculating the Wealth of Britain, 1760-2000. 
This section outlines the data and methodology used in compiling stocks of British wealth, 
including reproducible, natural and human capital from 1760-2000, and presents our 
findings. These data, when reported as the changes in wealth also provide one measure of 
GS, which is compared to estimates of GS based on direct measures of investment in section 
4. Please refer to the “Data Appendix” for full details on historical sources used. 
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2.1 Total wealth 
A top-down estimate of total (or comprehensive) wealth facilitates identifying the shares of 
each form of measured capital within total wealth, and the estimation of social capital as a 
residual, sometimes labelled as intangible wealth. This residual will also include some of the 
value of other missing assets if they are reflected in public and private consumption flows. 
We adopt the World Bank (2006, 2011) methodology and estimate total wealth in year t as 
the present value of consumption (private and government) flows over (t+25) years4. That 
is, for each year in the data, total wealth is the discounted value of consumption looking 25 
years forwards. From 1987 to 2000 we use the World Bank methodology of calculating 
wealth which treats consumption as an annuity. Aggregate consumption is discounted by 
2.5%/year, which equates to the average interest on British government long bonds 1765-
2000 less retail price inflation, as reported by Officer and Williamson (2013). Both wealth 
and wealth per capita are presented in Figure 1. All values have been deflated to the 2000 
price level using a GDP deflator. As can be seen, both total wealth and wealth per capita 
rose over the period. 
Figure 1: Total wealth and wealth per capita, 1760-2000 
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2.2 Reproducible capital 
Both gross and net historical reproducible capital stock estimates are available. Since our 
timeframe incorporates periods of substantial structural and technological change, we 
utilize measures of the net produced capital, taken from Feinstein and Pollard (1988), 
Feinstein (1972) and Kamps (2006), see Figure 2.  
Figure 2: Net reproducible capital stock, 1760-2000 
 
2.3 Natural Capital 
Natural capital is measured as consisting of non-renewable resources such as coal and iron 
ore; renewable resources such as forests; and the value of agricultural land. This omits some 
types of natural capital, for example the non-market value flows from ecosystems. There 
are essentially two ways of valuing natural capital, which we comment on in section 4. The 
World Bank methodology values the sum of discounted income streams (rents) from 
exploiting a country’s stock of, for example, oil, over a discrete time period which is related 
to a measure of resource lifetimes. The net present values of natural capital have been 
calculated as the discounted rents looking 25 years forwards in time from the year of 
calculation. For the years 1760-1970, we thus take the discounted values of rents (price 
minus cost multiplied by production) in each year over a 25-year time horizon. That is, for 
the 1800 estimate, we add up discounted rents from 1800 to 1825. For all years from 1985 
onwards, we project forwards future rents so that we always sum up discounted returns 
over 25 years.5 The implication for non-renewable resources is that, irrespective of the 
physical size of a reserve (e.g. of coal) which may last for centuries at present rates of 
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consumption, its asset value relates to the possibility of an economy to effectively utilise it 
to generate value.  
An alternative approach by Muñoz et al (2012) places a monetary value on the measured 
stock of natural capital reserves in any year, which assumes that all of a reserve is exploited 
in the year of accounting. This emphasises the physical scale of the reserves and is much 
more susceptible to changes in the rate of discovery or depletion.  
2.3.1. Forestry 
The measures of forest stocks combine estimates of the volume of timber (m3) per hectare 
and the forest area, Figure 3. Forestry rents are calculated by multiplying the annual change 
in the standing volume of timber by timber prices per m3 less the cost of labour; we then 
calculate the present value of these annual rents which include positive and negative 
changes in the standing volume (see the Data Appendix for sources). Muñoz et al measures 
of the stock are derived by estimating the standing volume of timber multiplied by the 
price-cost of timber, both estimates are presented in Figure 4.  
Figure 3: Standing volume of timber and change in standing volume of 
timber, 1750--2000 
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Figure 4: Value of British timber stocks, 1770-2000. 
 
2.3.2 Coal 
Coal reserves are subject to a distinction between what is technologically feasible and what 
is economically viable to extract. As technology progresses, deeper and otherwise less-
accessible schemes become more accessible. Technological advance is driven partly by 
cumulative extraction. However, at any moment in time, the measure of economic reserves 
will also depend on current prices and extraction costs. Cumulative production over time 
exerts an upward influence on costs, even as technological progress pushes costs down.   
The estimates published in the 1905 Royal Commission give the most detailed assessments 
of what total reserves were at a point in time, but this is not equivalent to an economic 
reserve. The data from the 1940s give us estimates of reserves that are recoverable and 
proven at that point in time. They exclude much of the reserve estimates made by the 1905 
Commission. Table 1 outlines spot estimates of coal reserves from 1866 to 2010. There are 
large variations in the estimates because of the opinions of geologists and what is 
considered economic to extract varies with changes in geological knowledge and 
technology. A coal reserve may 'shrink' for example because on closer investigation 
geologists discover that it is very complex and fractured and difficult to mine, even though 
the amount of coal is the same. 
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Table 1: Coal reserves and extraction between dates, 1866-2010 
  Knowna Possibleb Reserve 
estimate at 
time t 
(total)c 
Total 
Extraction 
from 1750 
to date of 
reserve 
estimate 
Total 
Extraction at 
date as % of 
reserve 
   (million 
tonnes) 
(million 
tonnes) 
% 
c.1866   85,544 3,381 3.95 
c. 1870 97,526 100,917 198,433 3,822 1.93 
c. 1905 106,153 40,721 146,874 9,881 6.73 
c. 1912   186,494 11,721 6.29 
c. 1915   235,000 12,528 5.33 
c. 1940 20,500 13,376 33,877 18,265 53.92 
c. 1945-46   54,604 19,441 35.60 
c. 1947   49,387 19,639 39.76 
2010  262 2527  2789+ 27,302  
1750-2010    27,302  
Sources: see data appendix. Notes: 
a are available reserves known by contemporaries 
b Reserves deemed likely to exist by contemporaries 
c is the sum of both the known and the possible reserves at the time of the estimate  
+ This is an economic reserve. The WEC (2010, pp 38-39) note that ‘the amount of coal in place that hosts the 
proved recoverable reserves is put at 386 million tonnes, implying an average recovery factor of 0.59. At lower 
levels of confidence are a ‘probable’ amount in place of 262 million tonnes, of which 155 is deemed to be 
recoverable (also with a recovery factor of 0.59), and a ‘possible’ in situ tonnage of 2 527 million tonnes, of 
which 1 396 (55%) is classed as recoverable. A further amount of 1 636 million tonnes is reported by the 
Member Committee as representing potential additional recovery from known resources. The UK’s known 
resources of coal are dwarfed by its undiscovered resources, with nearly 185 billion tonnes estimated to be in 
place, of which about 41 billion is deemed to be recoverable.’ 
 
In our calculations presented in Figure 5, we have chosen the 1905 reserve estimates as a 
benchmark, as these provide the fullest detail. Furthermore, as the issue is the amount of 
workable reserves, those reserves deemed technologically workable in 1905 we assume 
would be workable in the future, even if uneconomic now. The known reserves from the 
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1905 coal commission (B.P.P. 1905) are used as a benchmark to obtain estimates of British 
coal reserves over the period 1750-2000 by adding annual coal extracted pre-1905 to this 
benchmark and subtracting annual extraction post-1905. Figure 6 shows the value of coal 
reserves using both the approaches of the World Bank and Muñoz et al (2012). These 
different methods of valuing natural capital yield massively different results, as the WB 
method is just a lagged curve of the value of the extracted coal, while changes in the values 
using the Munoz method are driven by changes in coal prices and wages as the actual stock 
doesn’t change that much. Thus our WB measure increases steadily as both prices and 
extraction increases and peaks in 1939, thereafter declining; whereas our Munoz measure 
of stock value is more volatile and fluctuates according to the prevailing price levels.  
 
Figure 5: Coal stock and annual change in stock (million tonnes) 1750-2008 
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                       Figure 6: Value of coal reserve in Britain, 1770-2000. 
 
 
 
2.3.4 Iron Ore 
The benchmark estimate used to estimate an annual iron ore reserve was the 3870 million 
ton estimate from 1920 (Hatch, 1920). Previous iron ore extraction was added to this 
reserve and subsequent extraction subtracted from the figure, although no adjustments are 
made for variations in ore quality. Prior to 1850 the amount of ore extracted was relatively 
small and made very little difference to the reserve, although the accessible reserve in 1750 
was much smaller because of technological limitations. Figures 7 and 8 show the resultant 
physical and economic accounts, according to our two measures of resource wealth. 
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Figure 7: Iron ore reserve and change in reserve, 1760-2000 
 
Figure 8: Value of Iron ore reserve, 1801-2000 
 
2.3.5 Other Minerals 
UK mineral statistics also record the output of non-ferrous minerals such as copper, lead, tin 
and zinc over the period 1855 to 2000 and we have incorporated these minerals into our 
wealth accounts.  Data on tin, copper, lead and zinc extraction are from Mitchell (1988) and 
UK mineral statistics and mineral yearbook.  Figure 9 illustrates annual extraction of lead, 
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copper, tin and zinc. The extracted rental value of these minerals was low; collectively they 
reached around 0.2% of GDP in 1850 but this dwindled to around 0.02% by the 1920s. 
Figure 9: Lead, copper, tin and zinc extraction and reserve value 1855-2000 
 
 
2.3.6 Oil and Gas 
Oil and gas extraction were negligible before 1920 but became important with extraction 
from the North Sea, see Figure 10. In 1975 as serious production commenced, DUKES (1975) 
reports that there were 1,060 million tons proven reserves of oil, 1,205 million tons of 
probable reserves, 835 million tons of oil possible reserves, giving a total of 3,100 million 
tons. Reserves of gas were estimated at 44.4 trillion cubic feet in 1975. More recent 
estimates of oil and gas reserves show a decline. In December 2012 it was estimated that 
proven oil reserves were 405 million tonnes, probable reserves 405 million tonnes, possible 
reserves 253 and the maximum reserves 1064 million tonnes. For gas the corresponding 
figures were 244 billion cubic metres proven, 217 billion cubic metres probable, 238 billion 
cubic metres possible and 699 billion cubic metres as a maximum (DECC 2013). Figure 10 
shows imports and domestic oil production since 1920. 
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Figure 10: Imports and domestic extraction of oil (million tonnes), 1920-2000 
 
Figure 11: Value of oil reserve, 1920-2000. 
 
Figure 11 outlines the different methods of valuing oil, and illustrates the conflicts between 
the two valuation methods. The Munoz stock value peaks just after extraction of North Sea 
oil commences but decreases as the stock of oil declines, whereas the present value of oil 
rents increases because oil prices are increasing. The latter implies that even though there is 
less physically of the resource in 2000 than in 1920, the rise in real prices indicates that the 
value of the remaining stock is greater than at the start of extraction. The Munoz method 
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underestimates the value of the existing stock as it uses current prices to value the stock, 
rather than looking forward to future values. 
 
2.3.7 Agricultural Land  
Agricultural land is another component of a nation’s natural capital. We have calculated the value of 
British agricultural land using two alternative methods, multiplying the total area of agricultural land 
in any year with either the net present value of a stream of future agricultural rents, using the  
average sales price of agricultural land (note that applying the Munoz method makes no sense for 
this asset). The area of land in agricultural use changes only modestly since 1760, whereas there 
have been long cycles in values per hectare, partly reflecting the fall and rise of agricultural 
protection, see Figure 12. The net present value (NPV) of agricultural land is estimated as the 
discounted value of agricultural rents looking 25 years forwards. As the agricultural land in use is 
rather stable the total value of agricultural land in Britain shown in Figure 13 is driven by the 
fluctuation in rents or sales values, rather than changes in area.   
Figure 12, NPV of agricultural land per hectare in England & Wales, and Scotland 1770-2010, £/ha 
(2000 price level). 
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Figure 13, Value of agricultural land in England & Wales, and Britain 1770-2010, £/ha 
(2000 price level).  
 
 
Estimation of the value of agricultural land based on sale value per hectare provides 
consistently higher estimates of the value of agricultural land. We speculate the reason for 
this to be that sale values pick up other reasons for owning agricultural land besides purely 
agricultural returns, including the value of land in alternative uses (eg housing). We 
conclude that a calculation based on net present value of agricultural land provide a better 
estimate of the value of land for pure agricultural uses.  
2.4 Human Capital  
 
The value of the stock of human capital is estimated using the discounted sum of life time 
earnings. We follow, with some modifications, the methodology of Jorgenson and Fraumeni 
(1989) and Le, Gibson and Oxley (2006), and calculate a discounted sum of total annual 
income from employment discounted over the weighted average years left in the work life 
of the population in working age using the following formula:  
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Ht = Human capital in point t 
W = the total annual income from employment  
r = 1 – discount rate 
n = the average years left in the work life of the population in working age weighted 
by the wage share of males and females 
See the data appendix for sources and Kunnas et al (2013) for a more detailed explanation of the 
calculation. 
 
Figure 14 The Value of the UK human capital stock, 1760-2000 
 
The changing remaining time in workforce had only a small influence on human capital, as longer life 
expectancies were counteracted by an aging workforce and earlier retirement. As real wages 
remained almost constant in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the change in the workforce was 
initially the main driver of changes in human capital. Increases in the workforce remained the major 
driver of growth in human capital, even after real wages began to grow after the first decade of the 
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19th century, as the workforce grew by twice the rate of wages up to the mid 19th century, and one 
third faster from the second half to the First World War. The period after the world wars witnessed 
fast growth in real wages, while the growth in the workforce stagnated until after 1983, when the 
size of the workforce reached its lowest point since the end the Second World War.   
2.5 Bringing together the capital estimates 
Having measured reproducible capital, and elements of natural and human capital stocks, we can 
now estimate “intangible wealth” as the difference between total wealth (Figure 1) and the 
measured components. In the case of natural capital, the variant based upon the NPV of rents is 
adopted for the reasons outlined above. The results in Figure 15 show human capital was the major 
form of capital over the whole period, and accounts for around 60% of wealth both in 1770 and 
2000. Agricultural land was the major element of natural capital until 1893 when it was surpassed by 
coal. In 1770 from 14% of total wealth was natural capital, but only 1% was minerals. The 
contribution of natural capital to wealth diminished over the next 200 years, but increased after 
1970 with the exploitation of North Sea fossil fuel reserves. In 1970 oil and gas represented more 
than seventy percent of all natural capital, with an increasing share ever since (driven by a long-term 
upward trend in real prices into the future). The share of produced capital in wealth was relatively 
stable, but increased to over 10% in the twentieth century. Residual or intangible wealth peaked at 
around 30% in 1870, but its share was typically lower in the twentieth century.  
Figure 15: The composition of wealth 
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To compare these findings to others using the same approach, we consider estimates for 
the UK in 2000, contained in World Bank (2006) – no earlier estimates are available to 
enable a similar comparison. Table 2 shows the results. It should be noted that the World 
Bank measure of intangible capital includes human capital, while we have calculated it 
separately. Hamilton and Liu (this volume) also report UK wealth decompositions for 2005, 
distinguishing the share of human capital at 61%.  
 
Table 2: The composition of UK comprehensive wealth per capita in 2000 US $: 
comparison of this study with World Bank estimate. 
 Net reproducible capital Natural capital  Intangible capital  Total Wealth 
World Bank estimates 55,239 7,167 346,347 408,753 
This study: natural 
capital as PV rents  59,485 39,078 425,866 524,429 
This study: Muñoz  
natural capital values 59,485 29,142 292,115 524,429 
 % % % % 
World Bank estimates 14 2 85 100 
This study: natural 
capital as PV rents 13.78 9.05 77.17 100 
This study: Muñoz  
natural capital values 13.78 6.75 79.47 100 
Notes:  Intangible capital includes human capital. The World Bank estimates for the UK include Northern 
Ireland. Their lower value of total wealth may also reflect their use of a 1.5%/year discount rate.  
 
3. British Genuine Savings, 1760-2000. 
This section reports estimates of Genuine Savings (GS) measured constructed directly from 
investment data. That is, we obtain figures for the year-on-year change in each element of 
the total capital stock, and then aggregate these together for any year (see Greasley et al, 
2013, for more details). Later on in the paper we compare this “bottom-up” approach with a 
“top-down” approach based on changes in estimated total wealth. Six series of increasingly-
comprehensive measures of investment were constructed:  
1. NFCF: annual changes in produced net domestic fixed assets 
2.  NETPINV: annual changes in net produced capital and net overseas assets 
3. GREENINV: NETPINV plus changes in elements of the stock of natural capital 
4.  GS: GREENINV plus public education investment 
5. GSTFP: GS plus the value of changes in exogenous technological progress, as measured by 
changes in total factor productivity 
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6. GSTFPW: GSTFP less wealth dilution  
We now report on findings for each of these. 
3.1 Genuine Savings in the Industrial Revolution, 1760-1850. 
The investment-based estimates of GS are of particular interest over the period of the First 
Industrial Revolution. Economic historians have long debated the importance of a rise in the 
savings (or investment) ratio during the Industrial Revolution. Rostow (1960) argued a 
necessary condition for sustained growth was a rise in the net investment to national 
income ratio from around 5% to 10%, for output to outstrip population growth when capital 
productivity was low. He tentatively dated the period of ‘take-off’ for Great Britain as 1783-
1802. Subsequent work, notably Feinstein (1978) denied a sharp rise in the investment ratio, 
instead arguing the gross domestic investment ratio had reached 12% by the 1780s and 
changed little over the next 50 years. Deane and Cole (1969) and Crafts (1985) are more 
sympathetic to the idea that the investment ratio rose, but they suggest this happened over 
a more extended period. One curiosity of these studies is their focus on gross investment 
whereas Rostow (1960) posits net investment as the relevant measure for sustained growth. 
Our measure of GS incorporates a wider definition of net investment than used by the 
above authors. Most importantly, GS broadens the concept of net investment to include 
natural resource depletion and investment in human capital. For the period 1761-1860, the 
estimated GS essentially reflects the extent mineral resource depletion was offset by 
investments in produced capital. Net domestic fixed investment (NFCF) averaged 1.1% of 
GDP in the 1770s and rose sharply to 4.3% of GDP during the 1830s and peaks at 5.3% 
during the ‘railway age’ of the 1840s. The results of Table 3 show GS was negative 1760-80, 
as the extraction of coal and iron ore rents more than offset NFCF. Extracted rents, relative 
to GDP rose further in the first half of the nineteenth century, but GS was positive, and 
exceeded 2% of GDP during the manufacturing and railway investment expansions of the 
1830s and 1840s. When railway investment fell in the 1850s so did GS, although it remained 
positive. 
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Table 3: Mean Genuine Savings rates (% GDP) 1761-1860 (decade averages) 
 NFCF Education 
Investment 
Forestry Minerals 
Extraction 
GS 
1761-1770 0.52   -1.10 -0.58 
1771-1780 1.12  0.05 -1.20 -0.04 
1781-1790 1.38  0.04 -0.80 0.62 
1791-1800 1.79  0.03 -0.65 1.17 
1801-1810 2.22  -0.02 -1.23 0.97 
1811-1820 2.51  -0.03 -1.35 1.13 
1821-1830 3.33  -0.05 -1.69 1.60 
1831-1840 4.27 0.01 0.01 -1.35 2.93 
1841-1850 5.31 0.02 0.01 -1.75 3.60 
1851-1860 3.95 0.08 0.02 -2.47 1.58 
Sources: see Data Appendix 
 
Within a GS framework the case for limiting produced investment to fixed capital formation 
and domestic investment appears dubious. Inventories and work in progress (sometimes 
defined as circulating capital) were important elements of capital formation during the 
Industrial Revolution, and circulating capital increased in every decade 1761-1860. Countries 
can also hold wealth in the form of investments in other countries. Fixed investment grew 
more quickly than circulating, which largely explain why, given overseas investment was 
modest before the 1850s, the NETPINV ratio, see Table 4, rose less quickly than the NFCF 
ratio. Nevertheless, once circulating capital is included, NETPINV offset the effects of 
minerals extraction in the 1760s and 1770s to give a positive GS for these decades. 
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Table 4. Mean Genuine Savings rates (% GDP) 1761-1860 (decade averages) 
 NETPINV Education 
Investment 
Forestry Minerals 
Extraction 
GS 
1761-1770 1.91   -1.10 0.82 
1771-1780 3.05  0.05 -1.20 1.90 
1781-1790 3.44  0.04 -0.80 2.69 
1791-1800 4.13  0.03 -0.65 3.50 
1801-1810 1.97  -0.02 -1.23 0.72 
1811-1820 5.89  -0.03 -1.35 4.52 
1821-1830 7.31  -0.05 -1.69 5.57 
1831-1840 5.66 0.01 0.01 -1.35 4.32 
1841-1850 7.62 0.02 0.01 -1.75 5.91 
1851-1860 7.77 0.08 0.02 -2.47 5.40 
Sources: see Data Appendix 
 
Other features of the GS estimates of Table 4 are worth highlighting. The GS ratio falls 
sharply 1801-10, though remains positive. The fall probably reflects the effects of the 
Napoleonic Wars. While NFCF rose, the increase in circulating capital in the first decade of 
the new century was lower than in the 1790s. Further, net overseas investment was 
negative 1801-10. Net overseas investment was relatively modest in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. In the 1840s it was less than one quarter the value of net domestic 
investment. Net overseas investment surged in the 1850s and amounted to around two-
thirds the value of net domestic investment in that decade. The sharp fall in the GS ratio 
shown in Table 3 for the 1850s is not mirrored in the results of Table 4, reflecting the 
heightened importance of overseas investment to the British economy in the 1850s. By the 
1850s, natural resource depletion in the UK was being offset by net overseas investment, a 
feature that would persist until the First World War.  
 
  22  
3.2 Genuine Savings since 1860 
NETPINV relative to GDP nearly doubled 1860-1914 compared to the average of the 
previous century, see Table 5. This was largely due to higher net overseas investment which 
underpinned rise in the GS/GDP ratio in the period 1850-1910 to a peak of around 9%. 
Produced investment fell dramatically during the world wars, and the NETPINV ratio was 
low 1914-45. The recovery of produced investment after 1945 was largely due to a rise in 
NFCF. GS typically mirrors the contours of produced investment. However, while GS shows 
lower values than NETPINV to 1914, reflecting the depletion of minerals, GS was above 
NETPINV in the twentieth century, reflecting the rise in education investment. The 
increasingly-comprehensive measures NETPINV, GREENINV, GS, and GSTFP are illustrated as 
Figures 17 and 18.  The real values of British GS per capita and of GS as a percentage of GDP 
were generally positive 1860-2000, but negative during the First and Second World Wars. 
 
Table 5: Net Produced Investment (NETPINV) and GS as % GDP 1760-2000 
 
 NFCF Inventories Net Domestic Net Overseas NETPINV GS 
1760-1860 2.64 1.08 3.72 1.15 4.87 3.56 
 
1860-1914 3.73 0.74 4.47 4.70 9.17 7.68 
1918-1938 2.39 0.01 2.40 0.82 3.22 3.26 
1946-2000 7.06 0.60 7.66 -0.22 7.44 9.54 
1914-1918 0.07 -0.62 -0.55 0.21 -0.34 -2.50 
1939-1945 -0.91 -0.20 -0.71 -7.56 -8.27 -8.60 
1946-1968 7.42 0.96 8.38 0.01 8.39 10.43 
Sources: see Data Appendix. 
  23  
Figure 16: Alternative Investment measures as % GDP 
 
Note: The TFP measure is based on a 20 year horizon and 2.5%/year discount rate. 
 
Figure 17: Alternative Investment measures per capita 
 
3.3 Allowing for technological progress in the measurement of Genuine Savings. 
Weitzman (1997) and Pemberton and Ulph (2011) advocate the inclusion of exogenous 
techological progress in assessments of (changes in) the capital stocks of a country. Treating 
time as an uncontrolled capital stock means productivity’s contribution to the change in 
wealth in any year should be added to GS. The case for including exogenous technological 
progress within a more comprehensive investment measure appears strong in light of the 
widespread evidence that residual productivity plays a central role in the consumption 
growth of OECD countries. Trend TFP estimates shown in Figure 19 underpin our valuation 
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of exogenous technological progress. Our approach to gauging how TFP contributes to 
changes in the value of wealth follows Pezzey et al (2006) and calculates the present value 
of future changes in TFP over a 20 years horizon using a 2.5%/year discount rate.  According 
to this methodology, the value of discounted technological progress, relative to GDP 
increases over time. For 1765-1799 the average is 2.21%, 1800-1899 it is 7.85%, 1900-1949 
it is 15.34%, and 1950-1999 it is 21.21%6. GSTFP averaged 29% of GDP 1960-2000. 
 
Figure 18 Trend TFP growth rate, 1766-2020 (%) 
 
Notes: for sources and methods see Data Appendix 
 
4. Investment and changes in Wealth: some puzzles 
In this section, we review 4 puzzles in wealth accounting and measuring GS, which have all 
been hinted at above. First, GS should be equal to changes in total wealth. We have 
measured GS in section 3 using annual figures for net investment/depletion of each element 
of total capital (a “bottom up” approach). Wealth can also be measured in a bottom-up way 
for each part of total capital which can be measured, and this is what we reported in section 
2. However, total wealth and intangible (residual) wealth is calculated using a top-down 
approach, which starts from the present value of future (public + private) consumption 
flows. As Figure 20 shows, the estimates of total wealth changes differ from those of 
investment-based GS. GSTFP conform reasonably well with changes in total wealth 1900-75, 
but for earlier and later years there are marked disparities. Nor do the key drivers of the 
                                                          
6
 It is interesting to compare the size of this adjustment with Weitzman (1997): he found that a technological 
change premium could be as high as 40% of NNP.  
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change in wealth, particularly human capital formation, match the dominant investment 
variables, namely produced investment and the value of technology. The discrepancies in 
the components of wealth and investment partly reflect measurement conventions, which, 
for example, ascribe technology-productivity gains to labour in the wealth accounts, but 
where, in contrast, the value of TFP encapsulates technology in the investment accounts. 
Similarly, the extraction of minerals equates to disinvestment in the investment accounts, 
while the value of natural resource rents can increase, alongside extraction, in the wealth 
accounts. Indeed, at the component level, only produced investment is defined as 
equivalent to changes in the produced capital stock. Top down estimates of wealth rest on 
the quality of the consumption data, but also on a range of assumptions, including of the 
discount rate (Hamilton and Liu, this issue).  
One possibility is that the ratio of income, and thus of consumption, to wealth was lower 
before 1900, and that the top down approach overstates changes in wealth over these 
years. The intuition here is that the returns to wealth were smaller in the lower productivity 
pre-1900 economy. Over the entire period 1760-1986, the ratio of GSTFP to change in total 
wealth was 49 %. However, for the sub-period 1948-1974 the ratio was 85 % but this 
declined to an average of 60% in the sub-period 1975-1986. The reason for this drop is 
mainly due to faster growth in consumption in the period 1975-2000, 2.38% versus 1.82% 
for GSTFP. This is particularly evident in the period 1975-1986, the least discounted years in 
the wealth calculation, where consumption grew at 1.80% whilst GSTFP grew at a rate of 
0.57% per annum. From 1987 onwards wealth is estimated using a different methodology 
which explains later divergence. Post-1987 wealth data are derived from the present value 
of consumption from a single year rather than the smoothed net present value of 25 years 
of consumption, thus explaining the fluctuations.  
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Figure 19: Change in total wealth, GS and GSTFP per capita, 1760-1986  
 
 
 
The investment accounts only partially measure some forms of natural and most especially 
of human capital. Investment in education would ideally incorporate the value of private as 
well public education. Workplace training, including apprenticeships and mentoring, is also 
missing from our estimates of education investment. Accordingly, the contribution of 
human capital formation in the investment-based estimate of GS is small, at least before 
1945. In contrast, the life-time earnings approach to gauging the value of the human capital 
stock shows that human capital dominates total wealth. The difference essentially reflects 
the choice of accounting convention. In the investment-side accounts, gains in labour 
productivity connected to human capital formation reside in the measure of TFP. Without 
augmenting GS with a value of TFP, the GS/GDP ratio averages around 9% after 1945, 
whereas GSTFP/GDP averages 29%. Around two-thirds of GSTFP since 1945 is associated 
with residual productivity, which will partly reflect unmeasured human capital formation, 
but also exogenous technology and intangible, social capital. An important issue is thus 
whether top-down measures of changes in total wealth or bottom up investment measures 
augmented with TFP provide the more robust indicator of GS and thus sustainability.  On 
balance, our view is that bottom up investment-based measures augmented with TFP are 
likely to better represent British GS in the long run. 
A second puzzle relates to how to value changes in non-renewable resources as one 
component of natural capital. As Section 2 shows, using the World bank discounted future 
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rents approach gives a very different picture, especially for oil and gas and for coal. Which 
measure to prefer depends on whether we think that current abundance is a more 
appropriate measure of a resource than likely future price changes. Related to this is the 
problem that the state of technology in any year partly dictates what we consider to be part 
of this natural capital. A national accountant in 1800 would not have counted North Sea oil 
reserves as part of the UK’s national wealth, since there was no technology available to 
exploit it. Yet the oil was still there. A third puzzle refers to the measurement of wealth 
through the use of discounted present values of future returns, since in both theory and 
numerical calculations of GS and comprehensive wealth we often assume the relevant 
discount rate to be constant over time, and that this rate of return applies equally to all 
sectors of the economy. Yet the historical record shows us that neither of these 
simplifications describes reality (eg for the UK over the period considered in this paper).  
Finally, we need to be able to handle changes in population and think about the effects of 
pollution on measures of wealth and changes in wealth. The next two sections briefly 
consider these issues for our period. 
 
5. Including the effects of carbon dioxide emissions in the GS accounts. 
Contemporary estimates of GS often include a value for the costs of CO2 emissions as a 
depreciation of the stock of natural capital – an erosion of the earth system’s ability to 
absorb greenhouse gases and avoid catastrophic warming (World Bank, 2011). British 
carbon dioxide emissions over time equate to disinvestment in assimilative capacity. The 
marginal damage cost of CO2 is lower in earlier years (eg 1750) since carbon dioxide is a 
stock pollutant. One carbon unit added to present-day higher stocks will cause more 
damage than a unit emitted under the lower concentration levels in the past. Following 
Lindmark and Acar (2013), the unit damage price is discounted by 2%/year, since the social 
cost of carbon is time dependent, as more damage occurs in the future.  There are large 
variations in the estimates of the unit costs of climate change from carbon emissions. Tol’s 
(2008) estimate of $23/tC in 1995 is from a meta-analysis of 211 estimates of the social cost 
of carbon. The Stern Review (2007) postulated a range of higher costs in 2000 from £68.2/tC 
to £201.2/tC depending on whether or not future emissions are stabilized at 550ppm CO2e 
or continue to grow (the lower price was used by Lindmark and Acar, 2013). These three 
unit damage price estimates, together with historical carbon emissions data based on 
information inBoden et al. (1995, 2012) and Warde (2007) yield the damage costs illustrated in 
Figure 20, which are then incorporated in the GS estimates in Figure 21.  
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Figure 20: Annual costs of carbon dioxide emissions (2000 prices), 1760-2000 
 
Carbon emissions, within the postulated range of unit damage price had very little effect on 
the sustainability of past British economic development as measured by GS. However, that 
does not mean emissions of carbon dioxide will have only limited effects on future 
prosperity. Past emissions have eaten into the cumulative absorption capacity, and can thus 
be seen as an environmental depletion with potentially lasting consequences. The 
cumulative costs to 2000 range from £100-480 billion depending on which unit price we use, 
with 96% accrued since 1900. This represents a big debt to future generations. 
 
Figure 21 British GS with Carbon Costs, 1765-2000 
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6. Population change and wealth-dilution. 
Ferreira, Hamilton and Vincent (2008) argue the wealth dilution effects of population 
growth should be included in GS. Their “wealth dilution effect” is the product of the 
population growth rate and total wealth per capita, and arises from the sharing of a given 
amount of capital between more people. So long as the population growth rate is positive, 
wealth dilution, reduces GS per capita. Average British population growth over the period 
1760-2000 is 0.86%/year. The rate was higher before 1900, to raise a potentially high barrier 
to sustainable development as defined by a positive GS. Figure 23 shows the size of the 
wealth dilution adjustment, which rises strongly to around 1900. The swings in twentieth 
century wealth dilution partly reflect the fluctuations in wealth and population growth 
around the world wars. Generally, lower rates of population growth diminish wealth dilution 
in the twentieth century, although data quality varies across the period making inferences 
more difficult. For more analysis on the implications of this effect, see Greasley et al (2013). 
Also, as noted above, the sharp fluctuations post-1987 are statistical artefacts arising from 
estimating wealth from a single years consumption.  
Figure 22: Change in total wealth per capita adjusted for wealth dilution and Wealth dilution from 
population growth, 1761-2000  
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6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper reports one of the first attempts to measure Total Capital or Comprehensive 
Wealth over the long run. The wealth estimates show that Britain built-up stocks of 
produced and human capital, as it depleted some stocks of natural capital (principally coal), 
while other natural capital (land and forests) became relatively less important. Estimates of 
the value of non-renewable resources as part of natural capital vary substantially according 
to which approach is used for their measurement. Our Genuine Savings (GS) indicator shows 
these year-on-year changes in comprehensive wealth. Overall, we find that GS was positive 
1760-2000, except during major wars. The chief puzzles arise in the comparisons of changes 
in total wealth and GS when measured from the investment side. The top down estimates of 
wealth show higher levels of GS pre-1900 than the investment series, even when the later 
are augmented with a value of technology. On balance, our view is that the more pessimistic 
investment-based estimates are the more robust.  
Thus, a (hypothetical) Treasury minister in 1780s London who estimated GS as an indicator 
of the sustainability of development during the Industrial Revolution should have looked 
forward to rising well-being over the next 100 years, but, if prudent, the assessment would 
have reflected upon and been tempered by the uncertainties surrounding faster population 
growth and warfare. By the 1850s sustainability was more certain. The most important 
adjustments to Britain’s capital stock turn out to have been investments in produced capital 
and, before 1914, in overseas assets, which more than offset the value of the depletion of 
non-renewable coal and iron ore stocks. Thereafter, with slower population growth and 
knowledge advances, including those associated with human capital formation, only the 
declines in wealth during the two world wars raised serious doubts about British 
sustainability.  
The wealth accounts, by attributing productivity gains to workers, highlight the importance 
of human capital, which, in our estimates, comprises at least 60% of wealth in most years. In 
contrast, the direct measure of investment show lower, albeit faster rising, education 
investment. Thus, much of the value of investment-estimated GS resides in the value of 
technology, most especially in the twentieth century. The wealth accounts also include an 
intangible residual, which in our estimates peaks in importance at around 30% in the second 
half of the nineteenth century.  
On balance, our view is that the decompositions of wealth changes from the investment 
side have more value. This interpretation rests partly on the uncertain quality of the 
aggregate top down wealth estimates, which in turn affects the relative size of the 
measured elements of total wealth and the intangible residual. Additionally, while 
measuring human capital by (lifetime) wages has solid theoretical foundations and provides 
a plausible description, the approach by-passes the question of what drives wages. In part, 
the answer might be education investment, which can be isolated in the investment 
accounts, or a range of productivity forces, which again might be better explored via more 
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finely grained investment accounts. Accordingly, an empirical analysis of the relationship 
between GS and future well-being should probably utilize investment-side accounts.  
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